Continuity and Change in Stakeholder Influence

Reflections on Elaboration of Stakeholder Regimes

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ABSTRACT

For many years, universities have been regarded as operating in isolation from their socioeconomic and political environment. However, there is now a demand for universities to verify their relevance to society. One way of embedding universities in society is by involving external actors. This paper elaborates on stakeholder regimes as a means of studying the norms and structures for stakeholder influence over time. It contributes to the research in this area by linking stakeholder theory to a specific selection of normative and structural aspects of governance. This is done in order to construct a theoretical framework for analysing their effect on stakeholder influence in higher education practice. Furthermore, methodical issues such as policy tracing, document analysis and motivation for selecting cases are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

During the last 20 years, there have been major changes in Norwegian national policy regarding the governing of the public sector. Since the late 1980s, the private sector has been the role model for reforms in the public sector. The reforms are, among other things, characterised by market orientation, the use of contracts, performance assessment, and management by objectives (Christensen, Lægreid 2002). Measurable aspects of public activity are given priority and the main focus is on efficiency and effectiveness.

Many will argue that the same rate of change is to be found in higher education – which in Norway is predominantly in the public sector domain – both with regard to reforms in general and new public management (NPM) reform in particular. Much research about European higher education policy has shown a general shift from state control to state surveillance or supervision (Maassen, van Vught 1994). During the last 10 to 15 years more central steering instruments have been supplemented or replaced by quasi-market instruments and self-regulation. In Norway, this formally assumed mutually exclusive dualism of state control and state surveillance is not adequate as an analytical tool as long as more hybrid forms can be found (Bleiklie 1996, Gornitzka, Maassen 2000, Gornitzka, Maassen 2003, Kyvik 2002, Larsen, Norgård 2002, Olsen 2005).

External actors, or stakeholders, are said to exercise more influence on more issues than they did before. Terms such as the “entrepreneurial university” (Clark 1998), the “stakeholder society” (Neave 2002), the “corporate university” (Bleiklie 1998), and the university as a “service enterprise” (Olsen 2005) illustrate the ability to change and adapt to
new circumstances. This raises on one hand, questions such as who are these stakeholders, and what kinds of influence do they exercise? On the other hand, one might want to know what has changed and what remains of the former, more traditional governance models. Furthermore, do the reforms actually change practice within the university colleges? And do they allow new actors to exercise influence on higher education policy?

In order to contribute to this discussion, I have included the following research questions in my work-in-progress:

1. Which norms and structures for stakeholder influence in higher education policy and practice have developed during the period 1965-2006?
2. How and why may the norms and structures for stakeholder influence in higher education practice change or remain stable?

The first research question is descriptive and aims to explore both national policy and practice at two selected higher education institutions, i.e. how these institutions interpret and adapt to national policy. The planned research has been designed as a comparative case study of the University of Oslo and Telemark University College.

The second research question is an explanatory how-and-why question. The aim is to explain the development, i.e. continuity and change in stakeholder influence at the two institutions using historical institutionalism as a method. However, issues concerning this research question will not be discussed in this article. I have prioritised a more thorough discussion of the theoretical framework which allows me to answer the first – descriptive – research question.

The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is theoretical, i.e. to elaborate four stakeholder regimes which can be used in analysis of the development of both higher education policy and practice over time. The contribution of this paper is that stakeholder theory is linked to a specific selection of normative and structural aspects of governance. This is done in order to construct a theoretical framework for analysing their effect on stakeholder influence in higher education practice. The second is methodological; how can these regimes be applied to empirical data and which higher education institutions should be studied? First, this implies an examination of what the relevant sources might be and of what information these sources are expected to reveal. Secondly, motivations for selecting the University of Oslo and Telemark University College are briefly touched upon. The empirical contribution of my work-in-progress will be an in-depth study of stakeholder influence at these two institutions during a period of about 40 years, i.e. as examples of higher education practice. In order to lay the foundation for examining norms and structures for stakeholder influence, the presentation starts with an elaborative discussion of the elaboration of stakeholder regimes.

ELABORATING STAKEHOLDER REGIMES

Four stakeholder regimes, the expert, welfare, bargaining and entrepreneurial regimes, have been elaborated upon in different governance models and policy instruments, and in
stakeholder theory. These regimes are to be understood as ideal models in the Weberian sense. This section aims to show how the regimes are developed and to reveal some of the underlying considerations I have made during this process. This involves a discussion of the terms regime, norms and structures as well as a review of relevant governance models and stakeholder theory. The purpose is to develop the regime categories as a theoretical framework for analysing how norms and structures might affect stakeholder influence.

The models for analysing norms and structures affecting stakeholder influence will here be designated as regimes. There are several reasons for using regimes and not steering or governance models. They originate in a desire to find a concept that would make it possible to incorporate the notion of stakeholder – and thereby actors – in all the governance or steering models. This is in contrast to the assumption that external stakeholders form part of a market model and are thereby expected to be a more recent phenomenon – as claimed by, for instance, Olsen (2005) and Magalhães & Amaral (2000). Regime is defined as the principles, norms, rules and procedures on which the actors’ expectations can agree (Krasner 1982). This definition includes a group of actors. Furthermore, it incorporates a set of rules, or what is consistent with “set[s] of governing arrangements” (Keohane, Nye 1977:17). Finally, it implies that beliefs can be added to the framework, as Krasner defines principles as “beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude” (1982:186).

There are several examples of earlier research on policy instruments and governance arrangements in the field of higher education (Bleiklie 1996, Bleiklie 2000, Larsen 2007, Larsen, Norgård 2002, Maassen 2003, Olsen 2005, van Vught 1989). Bleiklie has described the university as a public agency, a cultural institution and a corporate enterprise (Bleiklie et al. 1996). Olsen (2005) presents four visions of the university as 1) a self-governing community of scholars 2) an instrument for national political agendas 3) a representative democracy and 4) a service enterprise embedded in competitive markets. These visions are based on his previous state models for studying the relationship between central authorities and agencies (Olsen 1988a, Olsen 1988b). Both Maassen (2003) and Larsen and Norgård (2002) to a large extent, base their theoretical reflections on Olsen’s original state models. The latter also incorporates some elements from Hood (1983), who is also reinterpreted by van Vught (1989) to be applied more specifically to higher education policy. Why, then, can I not apply any of these frameworks directly as they are? Despite the number of existing models, I found them hard to apply to empirical analysis designed to cover both national policy and organisational practice. There are three reasons for this. The frameworks are either very general when it comes to specifying the categories for the different governance models, and/or, there is a tendency to focus mainly on structures, i.e. institutional arrangements as steering instruments, and less on the normative aspects which are part of my research question. Finally, where the stakeholders are incorporated they are seen as a new phenomenon and not as something that has existed for some time though their nature may have changed. Furthermore, scholars studying public administration reforms in general claim that many of the recent public administration reforms contain elements which are not new (Hood et al. 2004, Peters 2001). Consequently, there is a need for analytical frameworks that can capture a multitude of both governance tools and normative foundations which may incorporate not only what is new but also what remains of previous governance models. For this reason, both Hood (1983) and Olsen (1988a, 1988b, 2005) seem a promising basis for the regimes to be elaborated on here.
Returning to the research questions outlined in the introduction, norms are the first dimension which presumably affects stakeholder influence. Norms can be understood as “collectively shared convictions” (Thelen, 1999:375). The explicit study of norms is driven by my desire to emphasise the normative foundation and – if possible – the ideological trends in policy and practice. Hood (1983) argues that dispensing information and policy signals may be one way for government to control public agencies – often without necessarily putting its authority at risk. Governmental statements of overarching goals, descriptions of ideas and the purpose of higher education institutions are interesting with regard to how they vary over time and whether they have any effect on stakeholder influence. The distinction between cultural and utility values is commonly used in other higher education studies to describe the purpose of the higher education institutions (Blekiklie et al. 1996, Gumport 2000, Marton 2000). The same distinction applies here. Ideas of how the state is supposed to operate with regard to public agencies in general and the higher education institutions in particular are important (Olsen 1988b, Peters 2001). This is a question of how – if at all – the state should steer society, i.e. higher education institutions. In the following, this aspect is labelled the role of the state. In his earlier work, Olsen (1988b) does not restrict the idea of autonomy to higher education. Any state agency may have autonomy, but the degree and the justification for it may vary. This paper applies the term reasons for autonomy, which corresponds with both his general state models and his visions of the university. Questions about higher education’s relevance in society and its legitimacy are ever more frequent. The societal responsibility is no longer taken for granted (Olsen 2000). In this paper, demands on higher education institutions refer to such debates. The stance taken towards students is interesting as a category since students are now often described as consumers. This raises questions like if this is really the case, how was the student viewed earlier? That he or she should attain education and knowledge for its own sake is not necessarily the only alternative. Education might as well be regarded as a means of obtaining a job. The norm dimension does not, however, imply that the norms of each and everyone within the selected organisations will be examined. Here, the focus is on how the organisation or each faculty as a whole presents itself to others and adapts national policy.

The second dimension of the first research question concerns the structures corresponding to institutional arrangements for exercising “collective control and influence over the societies and economies for which they have been given responsibility” (Peters 2001:1). This includes both external governance mechanisms at the system level and internal organisation and management. The designing of laws and formal authority, principles for funding and for internal organisation are all important governmental tools for analysing both the relationship between government and higher institutions and the practice of the latter. If we turn to Hood (1983), we find examples of tools such as treasury and authority as well as internal organisation. Olsen (1988a, 1988b, 2005) incorporates organisational forms as well as decision-making systems and assessment both in the state models and the visions of the university. In the following, these tools are discussed more thoroughly.

Treasury is understood as what makes it possible for the “government to exchange, to buy favours, to court popularity, to hire mercenaries” (Hood 1983:40). In higher education, funding tools range from tied grants to block grants, possibly with some kind of performance based allocations. In Norway, grants have been tied to the number of students
and the production of graduates. In addition, there are economic incentives for research publications (Bleiklie 2000).

Authority tools rely on the ability to make laws and regulations which actors and agents are expected to respond to and to obey (Schneider, Ingram 1997). These regulations grant permission, prohibit, command and recommend. However, the degree of constraint and enablement may vary (Hood 1983). Designed as directives, these tools may regulate the institutions’ activities in every detail. Imposed as basic laws, they provide the institutions with more room for manoeuvre within a given framework. In Norway, laws and regulations have traditionally regulated examinations, the degree structure, the institutions’ activities and internal organisation (Bleiklie 2000, Larsen, Norgård 2002).

Internal organisation as a tool enables direct action. It allows the government to control and influence “its subjects, their property or their environment” (Hood 1983:73). As an instrument, internal organisation also affects the extent to which the individual institutions can independently decide how to organise themselves and which forms that organisation may take. This includes who is eligible for the board, whether external representation is compulsory or not and whether leaders are elected or appointed – and by whom (Olsen 2005).

Additionally, Olsen (1988a, 1988b, 2005) applies the framing of the decision-making system and forms of assessment. The decision-making system deals mainly with how the authority structure is organised and on which principles it is based, i.e. decentralisation, hierarchy, dialogue or the adoption of market mechanisms. The latter refers to how activities such as research and education should be controlled and by whom. The question is whether assessment is to be carried out by the community of scholars, or if it should be ex ante or ex post.

According to Maassen (Maassen 2000), the term stakeholder may be linked to concepts of governing higher education, making it possible to take into account other important actors and networks than the state and higher education institutions. However, much of the literature on stakeholders in higher education is on the one hand closely linked to strategic management, e.g. giving higher education institutions “recipes” for stakeholder identification and the stakeholders’ importance (Burrows 1999, Goedegebuure et al. 2006, Goedegebuure, Lee 2006). On the other hand, it is perceived to be part of managerialism in higher education and thereby conceived of as something new (Amaral, Magalhães 2002, Maassen 2000, Neave 2002). My purpose is to explore the concept over time – applied at a university and a university college – does policy make any difference for stakeholder influence? This raises the question of how we understand the notion of stakeholder.

Neave (2002) argues that the “stakeholder society” is something new. Higher education institutions are no longer autonomous collectivities but stakeholder organisations. This implies a change in power relations within and around universities and university colleges. The institutions are supposed to be more responsive to the needs of the stakeholders when it comes to doing research and providing education than they were before. But – is this really a new phenomenon? If not, what kind of stakeholder influence was there before this more commonly accepted “stakeholder society”? In this study, I argue in favour of applying the
term stakeholder in a broader sense than is done by Neave (2002) and others. Assuming that the institutions have related to various actors – or stakeholders – through the years, the same concepts and definitions need to be applied in order to examine the potential changing nature of this relationship over a more extensive period of time. In their study of stakeholding in higher education, Amaral and Magalhães take Freeman’s definition of the stakeholder as their point of departure and adjust it; a stakeholder is thus “a person or entity with legitimate interests in higher education and which, as such, acquires the right to intervene” (Amaral and Magalhães, 2002:2). This definition shows that stakeholders can have a formal and an informal position. Furthermore, it implies that both internal and external stakeholders will be examined. Employees – both academics and administrative personnel – and students are internal stakeholders. The democratisation process in the 1970s illustrates changing power relations given that more employees and students gained access to decision-making bodies. External stakeholders refer to actors who normally do not work in the institution in question. For the higher education institutions which are publicly owned, the government is the main source of funding and thus an important external stakeholder. Other examples are regional authorities, local companies or other higher education institutions. Some of these may even have direct access to governance bodies, as the non-universities have a long tradition of external representation on their boards. Furthermore, the academic community in the fields of medicine, nursing, teacher training and engineering have long traditions for continuous dialogue with their professional associations. Consequently, they are here regarded as external stakeholders.

The first part of Table 1 shows the four stakeholder regimes: displaying not only the different norms and tools discussed above, but also how these may be directed and applied within each regime.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORMS</th>
<th>The Expert Regime</th>
<th>The Welfare Regime</th>
<th>The Bargaining Regime</th>
<th>The Entrepreneurial Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural vs. utility values</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Cultural and utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the state</td>
<td>Protect HE from the outside world</td>
<td>Social planner - architect</td>
<td>Protect autonomy and academic freedom</td>
<td>Organise and supervise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demands on higher education</td>
<td>Serve society as a whole</td>
<td>Implement public policy</td>
<td>Depend on the outcome of negotiations</td>
<td>Deliver services Open up to the outside world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stance towards students</td>
<td>Attain education and knowledge</td>
<td>Recipient, obtain a job</td>
<td>Participant</td>
<td>Consumer/ customer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for autonomy</td>
<td>Authority to the best qualified</td>
<td>Delegated and based on relative efficiency</td>
<td>Negotiated - mixed bases for autonomy</td>
<td>Depends on the ability to survive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>Based on previous allocations (block grants)</td>
<td>Tied grants</td>
<td>Negotiated</td>
<td>Block grants and allocations based on performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Basic laws</td>
<td>Detailed laws and directives</td>
<td>Affected parties working out regulations</td>
<td>Basic laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal organisation</td>
<td>Decentralised – Chair-system</td>
<td>Centralised – Appointed leaders</td>
<td>Representative Elected leaders</td>
<td>Decentralised – Appointed leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making system</td>
<td>Decentralised system</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Segmented system – dialogue</td>
<td>Market mechanisms and contractual coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment</td>
<td>Academic quality</td>
<td>Political effectiveness (input)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>Efficiency and flexibility – Performance control (output)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1:** Characteristics of the four stakeholder regimes.

The next part of Table 1 illustrates how the foundation of stakeholder influence is assumed to vary among the four stakeholder regimes.
In order to illustrate these models, two of the four regimes will be described in more detail. The welfare and the entrepreneurial regimes have been chosen because similar models have proved relevant in former higher education studies. Furthermore, it has been claimed that Norwegian public policy has moved away from traditional governance to more market orientation. The welfare regime is characterised by a centralised and hierarchical decision-making system. Furthermore, research and education are regarded as means of developing the economy and the welfare system. Consequently, utility is a key factor with respect to prioritising research and educational issues and deciding how they can contribute to national goals. Funding is input oriented and given as tied grants; the role of the state is that of a social planner. State authority is also exercised through detailed laws and directives. Leaders are appointed, preferably by the Ministry. The entrepreneurial regime is, on the other hand, characterised by a decentralised decision-making system. Leaders are not
elected but appointed, by either the management or the Board, which acts on recommendations from the management or some appointing committee. The role of the state is to organise and supervise the sector. Accordingly, both treasury and authority tools are designed to be general. Funding is given as block grants and may be linked to performance indicators. Regulation is ensured by basic laws, thereby giving each institution a certain room to manoeuvre and opportunities for local adjustments (Bleiklie et al. 1996, Hood 1983, Larsen, Norgård 2002, Olsen 2005).

According to Freeman, stakeholders have different foundations for their influence. These may be, respectively, voting, economic, and political (Freeman 1984). Voting influence refers to a relationship based on contracts and regulations and thus implies formal decision authority. Law regulates many aspects of institutional activity and management in higher education, even though what is regulated and to what extent varies over time. Employees, students and other stakeholders may have voting influence by virtue of participation in boards at institutional or faculty level or in other decision-making bodies. A stakeholder who can provide or retain resources has economic influence. Law formally regulates financial matters in the higher education sector, as do parliamentary proposals and the central government budget. Political influence allows actors to use their status in negotiations that affect an institution’s decisions (Burrows 1999). Political influence may on the one hand be formal; involved parties have the right to be consulted according to the Scandinavian cooperative tradition. On the other hand, it may take the form of more informal lobbying.

When it comes to an empirical analysis the regimes may be useful in the following way. They can for example provide guidelines for interpreting the higher education institutions’ cooperation with other parties. An institution which establishes a study programme or a single course as a result of enquiries from external stakeholders such as businesses or other private organisations might be interpreted as responding to demands by delivering services and opening up to the environment. If the external stakeholders only affect course content, they are assumed to exercise political influence. Exercising of economic influence can be added if these stakeholders pay for the planning and/or implementation of courses.

These regimes, as ideal models, might also be applicable to other policy fields than higher education, i.e. environmental policy, health policy or public administration reforms in general. However, this will require some modifications. Applied to health policy, stance towards students could for instance be replaced with stance towards patients – a characteristic more suitable for the policy field in question. The next section discusses how these regimes may be applied to empirical data as well as describing the kind of data I intend to use in my planned research and why.

**ANALYTICAL STRATEGY, DATA AND CASE SELECTION**

The stakeholder regimes are designed as tools for restricting empirical data. They are meant to help organise and guide the search and narrow down what is relevant and what is not. Furthermore, they can be used to structure the descriptive presentation in such a way that a time line can be followed for each of the characteristics of the norms and structures.
respectively. Additionally, the foundation of stakeholder influence and who the stakeholders are at any given time of the study will also be examined. In the following section, I will discuss the analytical strategy used in my work-in-progress, the empirical data I plan to use to analyse the stakeholder regimes, as well as criteria used in the selection of two higher education institutions.

**Policy Process Tracing**

Policy process tracing is here used as an analytical strategy, focusing on a sequence of events in the policy process. As an analytical strategy, it is somewhat similar to what has been called pattern matching (Bennett, George 1997, Yin 2003). The focus on sequence of events implies that multiple observations are analysed to recreate how the processes unfold (Hall 2003). George and Bennett (2005) describe policy tracing as a method consisting of two major characteristics. First, the study is to be structured according to theoretically deduced questions. These are posed in each case in order to standardise the data collection. This is to ensure that the data obtained are comparable. Second, it is a method of focused comparison. This implies that only certain theoretically relevant aspects of the selected cases are in focus. In my research stakeholder influence is, on the one hand, analysed in one case over time (diachronic). On the other hand, I compare two institutions (synchronic). Put differently, the empirical analysis is theory-driven in the sense that it will be based on the stakeholder regimes elaborated above – constituted by norms and structures which may imply changes in stakeholders’ influence relations.

**Documents**

To fulfil the empirical aim of the study, i.e. to describe the development of stakeholder influence in higher education policy and practice, the analysis will first and foremost be based on three kinds of documents. First, national policy documents, i.e. commission reports, budget proposals, White and Green Papers will be analysed in order to describe the policy level in terms of the stakeholder regimes outlined above. Policy signals with regard to demands and tasks that the government expects higher education institutions to prioritise and fulfil can be manifested in white papers and budget propositions.

Secondly, internal archival records such as budget proposals, board minutes, directors’ memos to the board, annual reports, strategic and other planning documents will be used. This is in order to obtain information on how the University of Oslo and Telemark University College, respectively, have responded to national policy, for instance how the institutions respond to national demands and prioritisations. Furthermore, who the actors actually were, what role they played and how they argued is also of relevance to the research question. Budget proposals can give information on the institutions’ priorities for instance in important areas of education and research, the need for established posts, etc. Compared with the assigned budgets, potential differences with regard to governmental priorities may be revealed. Strategic plans and annual reports aim to display goals and achievements for a fixed period. These goals will be analysed with regard to cultural vs. utility values, stance towards students and how the institutions relate to the environment. Furthermore, such plans may have a symbolic value (Cohen and March 1974). One problem with these kinds of documents is that many of them are written with certain
recipients in mind and therefore reveal only one of several perspectives for the analyst. Reports may for instance have been written to show regulating authorities that national goals have been fulfilled. However, using documents that are directed at both internal and external recipients, e.g. memos, case documents and annual reports, may to some extent help reduce the problem. Board minutes – including votings and dissents – and memos can give insight into different actors’ positions and their relative influence on specific matters. The Board is expected to make statements in public hearings, e.g. on law proposals. By analysing these minutes, issues that are prepared and discussed for an extensive period may give insight into alternating views, opinions/statements from different groups.

Primary data are supplemented by already existing studies of national policy and of the two selected institutions’ policies and practices related to the phenomenon in my work-in-progress. Although studies by other researchers only cover partial time segments of my study, they will be a useful complement to the primary data.

The next question I faced was the selection of which Norwegian higher education institutions to study. The following section will discuss considerations regarding the selection of two cases to illustrate trajectories in the development of stakeholder influence practices.

**Motivations for Selecting Studied Higher Education Institutions and Brief Case Descriptions**

The comparison of a university and a non-university is more interesting in terms of the assumptions of both historical institutionalism and stakeholder theory. These theoretical frameworks are the basis for the strategic selection of these two institutions. In the late 1960s, one of the goals in establishing the regional colleges was to contribute to regional development (Kyvik 1981). Presumably, public policy opened up for several external stakeholders exercising their influence from the very beginning. These stakeholders could come from both local and regional authorities as well as trade and business. As for the universities, their objective was to serve general ideals of knowledge and decorum and to preserve knowledge and the knowledge community. Recently, however, the relevance of universities has been questioned. Traditionally, universities have been presumed and assumed to be isolated from their surroundings; they are primarily concerned with cultural values. In accordance with these assumptions, and with reference to the discussion on stakeholder influence above, internal stakeholders are thus supposed to be the most important. Professors and other senior academics are the internal stakeholders with political influence and are invested with the authority to make formal decisions.

Several criteria have been considered when it comes to selecting one university (Oslo) and one university college (Telemark). The University of Oslo is the oldest and largest Norwegian university, established in 1811. It also offers the widest range of study programmes and degrees. Today, it has about 30,000 students and 4,600 employees. The University of Oslo has to relate to several faculties, departments, and disciplines. Not surprisingly, there are many presumably conflicting objectives and interests to take care of and balance. Consequently, a university college with a wide range of academic subjects as well as vocational training would be a suitable object for comparison in this study. The
non-university case selected for this study, Telemark University College, is located in the county of Telemark. It offers a broad range of vocational training and academic subjects at both undergraduate and graduate level. Today, there are about 5,000 students spread on several campuses in the county. As a merged institution, Telemark University College is quite young compared to the University of Oslo. Likewise, the different study programmes offered in the regional education system from the mid-1970s are relatively new. However, as institutions for vocational training – without higher education status – the regional colleges are definitely older.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

How should one study continuity and change in stakeholder influence in higher education? Here, four stakeholder regimes are developed – stemming from governance models and stakeholder theory. The contribution of this paper is the elaboration of a descriptive analytical framework that includes actors and which emphasises both normative and structural aspects. The models designed as regimes lend themselves for inclusion of actors. The aim is to describe the development – what is changing and what is not with regard to the selected characteristics of the norm and structure dimensions – and the consequences for stakeholder influence. Stakeholder influence is to be investigated at one old university and one more recently established university college over a 40 year period in order to compare (and later explain) its evolution. The analytical strategy is based on process tracing for unfolding events and processes, primarily using documents as sources of information.

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